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THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND TEXT IN THE
NEW IRAQ: AN EXPERIMENT IN ISLAMIC
DEMOCRACY*
Noah Feldman** & Roman Martinez***
INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2005, nearly ten million Iraqis cast ballots in a national
referendum on a new constitution. The charter had been prepared in the
wake of the American-led campaign to depose Saddam Hussein from
power, and in the midst of a raging insurgency. The final draft was
extremely controversial, especially with the minority Sunni Arab
community, which feared that the draft's version of federalism would
threaten the unity of Iraq. Over widespread Sunni opposition in the
referendum, however, the constitution won the approval of over seventy-
eight percent of Iraqi voters nationwide. It entered into effect two months
later, with the election of a new National Assembly under its auspices.'
* A version of this article will be published in Islam and Constitutionalism (Sohail Hashimi
& Houchang Chehabi eds., forthcoming 2007).
** Noah Feldman is Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. He served as
senior constitutional advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Apr. 2003-July
2003), and as a pro bono advisor to members of the drafting committee for the Transitional
Administrative Law (Nov. 2003-Mar. 2004). A.B. in Near Eastern Languages and
Civilizations, Harvard University, 1992; D.Phil. in Islamic Thought, Oxford University,
1994; J.D., Yale Law School, 1997.
*** Roman Martinez is a J.D. candidate in the Class of 2008 at Yale Law School. He
previously served as advisor on the Iraqi constitutional process to the U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq in Baghdad (July 2005-August 2005), as Director for Iraq at the National Security
Council at the White House (June 2004-August 2005), and as a political advisor to the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq (May 2003-June 2004). A.B. in History,
Harvard University, 2001; M.Phil in International Relations, Cambridge University, 2002.
He would like to thank Meghan O'Sullivan for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
essay. The views expressed in this essay are, of course, those of the authors, not of the
Coalition Provisional Authority or the U.S. government.
1. Dexter Filkins, Iraqis, Including Sunnis, Vote in Large Numbers on Calm Day, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
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For all the conflict surrounding its preparation, Iraq's new constitution is
a document of substantial historical significance. Although it was prepared
while U.S. troops remained in the country, democratic principles governed
the process by which it was written (by a directly elected Parliament) and
approved (by a national referendum). Such principles also figure
prominently in the charter's substantive provisions. Largely because of the
democratic character of the drafting and ratification process, the
constitution also reflects the strongly Islamic character of Iraqi electoral and
grass-roots politics in the post-invasion period. Indeed, it is fair to say that
the charter self-consciously aims to integrate Islamic values into the
country's political life while retaining the separation of powers, checks and
balances, and human-rights guarantees that are the hallmark of secular and
democratic constitutions around the world.
This essay seeks to examine the role of Islam and Islamic politics in
Iraq's emerging constitutional order. Focusing on the question of Islam in
particular, it provides the most detailed account of the drafting process
published to date. It also advances three major structural-historical claims
that have not been acknowledged in the growing literature on the topic. The
first is that the earliest origins of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 are to be
found in the Iraqi opposition politics that took place in the decade-and-a-
half beginning in the early 1990s. In this period, a core group of Iraqis,
most of whom were based in the Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq, Europe,
and the United States, sought to develop a common framework of
opposition to the Ba'thist regime. Democracy, Islam, federalism, pluralism,
and human rights-the cardinal values of the final constitution-all
achieved prominence in Iraqi political discussions during this period. In an
important sense, then, the constitution bears the imprint of the opposition
politics that preceded its drafting.
The second claim advanced in this essay is that, as the constitutional
process became increasingly participatory and democratic in the period
from the fall of Saddam Hussein to ratification, the constitution itself
became increasingly Islamic in orientation and detail. The antecedent ideas
present in the Iraqi opposition's earliest constitutional plans were largely
retained, but popular politics and the engagement with post-invasion
political reality altered the balance in favor of more explicit and powerful
provisions oriented to Islamic law. This balance changed in a series of
steps, each corresponding to a greater degree of majoritarianism in the
constitutional process. To put it simply, more democracy meant more
Islam.
The third claim is that while the final constitution sets the parameters for
the relationship between Islam and democracy in Iraq's political order, the
text alone is unlikely to determine the balance once and for all. For a
variety of reasons-including the ongoing insurgency, the constitution's
own textual ambiguities, and rapidly shifting ethnic and sectarian
alliances-the final balance between Islam and democracy in Iraq will
depend as much on everyday political practice as on specific constitutional
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provisions. In this sense, the Iraqi constitutional process continues, even
after ratification of the document itself.
Part I of this essay sets out a preliminary narrative of Iraq's constitutional
process, broadly understood to encompass the period from the early 1990s
(with the birth of the modem Iraqi opposition-in-exile) through the present
day. It argues that the basic political principles undergirding Iraqi
constitutionalism-Islam, democracy, federalism, pluralism, and human
rights-were shaped by the same Iraqi politicians who would rise to power
after the fall of Saddam Hussein. These figures, operating under a
constitutional process shaped first and foremost by the Iraqi Shi'i cleric 'Ali
al-Sistani, would later draw upon on these principles when drafting the
interim constitution in 2004 and the permanent charter the following year.
Part II, which addresses the role of Islam, individual rights, separation of
powers, federalism, and judicial review in the final constitutional text,
examines the key provisions through which Iraqi leaders sought to balance
Islamic and democratic values. 2 These provisions embody compromises
between Shi'i Islamists seeking to maximize the document's Islamic and
majoritarian aspects on the one hand, and, on the other, a loose coalition of
Kurds, secular nationalists, and the United States urging greater protection
of individual liberties and minority rights. Ultimately, all sides made
concessions, but the final constitution reflects the dominant political
strength of the Shi'i Islamists.
Part III completes the essay by drawing some necessarily tentative
conclusions about the Iraqi constitutional process overall. It stresses that
Iraqi politics remains in a state of flux, and that the relationship between
Islam and democracy will evolve over time. It is likely to be shaped, but
not fully determined, by Iraq's constitutional text.
One caveat is appropriate. Although this essay focuses on the interaction
between Islamic and democratic principles in the Iraqi constitutional
process, it is a striking fact that this interaction was not the major source of
controversy among domestic political actors inside Iraq as the drafting
unfolded. Federalism, not religion, proved the most contentious issue of all
in Iraqi constitutional negotiations. 3  From the beginning, most Iraqi
politicians agreed that their new regime would embrace Islam, democracy,
and human rights simultaneously. The only serious differences on these
issues concerned precisely how to balance these commitments within the
constitutional text. The Iraqi drafting debates over this balance were often
fierce, and competing attitudes over Islamic politics have fueled many of
the most passionate aiguments over specific constitutional provisions.
2. Except where otherwise noted, this essay relies upon the unofficial English
translation of the permanent Iraqi constitution made publicly available by the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/Constitution-EngUNs- 13.pdf.
3. This article examines the Iraqi constitution's approach to federalism only to the
extent that the federalism settlement may impact the role of Islam in Iraq's emerging
political and constitutional order.
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I. PROCESS
Formally, Iraq's constitutional process lasted just over six months, from
the inauguration of the first elected Parliament on March 16, 2005, through
the successful referendum on October 15 of that year. Broadly understood,
however, the process began much earlier, in the wake of the Gulf war of
1990-91, with the efforts of the Iraqi opposition-in-exile to hammer out
political principles that would govern a post-Saddam Iraq. The main
political players in this opposition were the same men who would write
Iraq's interim and permanent constitutions nearly fifteen years later. From
the start, the opposition's basic political vision for Iraq aimed to provide
simultaneously for democracy, Islamic values, federalism, pluralism, and
human rights. Over time, there would be considerable evolution in the
relative weight given to each of these principles, particularly as political
power shifted toward the Shi'i Islamists in the years immediately following
the war. But the core elements would remain the same and, with the
exception of federalism, would never be seriously challenged inside Iraq.4
A. Opposition
The modem Iraqi opposition sprung to life in a series of meetings that
took place in 1992 in Vienna and Salah ad-Din, a Kurdish city north of the
no-fly zone established by the United States in the wake of the Kuwait
war.5 For opponents of Saddam Hussein, the Kuwait war ended in great
disappointment. Having called for an uprising, the United States stood by
as the Iraqi regime crushed Shi'i and Kurdish rebellions. In the wake of the
uprising's failure, Iraqi opposition members of varying ethnic, religious,
and political backgrounds joined together with U.S. support to form the
Iraqi National Congress (INC), a loose umbrella organization which would
unite the disparate parties opposed to Saddam Hussein's rule. The INC
never became a particularly effective institutional force to fight the Ba'thist
dictatorship inside Iraq. It did, however, provide a framework for a series
of political meetings in which leading figures from each of Iraq's major
communities came together to discuss Iraq's future.6 The political diversity
of these meetings was significant, and they helped to develop a shared
consensus around a core set of key constitutional principles which the major
4. The only major opposition to this basic political vision has come from the Iraqi
insurgency, which has utterly failed to put forward a positive political program of its own.
5. For a good overview of the development of the Iraqi opposition in the context of the
tendentious U.S.-Iraqi international standoff in the 1990s, see Andrew Cockbum & Patrick
Cockburn, Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession 44-57, 164-90, 211-50, 278-81
(2002); Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq 55-108
(2002); David Wurmser, Tyranny's Ally: America's Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein 9-41
(1999); Laurie Mylroie, The United States and the Iraqi National Congress, Middle E.
Intelligence Bull., Apr. 2001, http://www.meib.org/articles/0104_irl.htm.
6. These meetings largely took place outside Iraq, but were also occasionally held in
the Iraqi Kurdistan region, in areas outside Saddam Hussein's control.
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opposition figures would later seek to implement following the American
invasion.
The most important among the Shi'i Islamist opposition groups were the
Da'wa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI). 7 Da'wa was founded inside Iraq in the late 1950s, under the
influence of the leading Shi'i cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who would
be murdered by Saddam's security services in 1980.8 Known for its blend
of Iraqi nationalism and Islamic values, Da'wa would leave the INC in
1995 over growing objections to the Kurdish demand for federalism.9 The
party eventually splintered, with varying factions being led from London,
Tehran, and inside Iraq. Following the war, two of its senior figures,
Ibrahim Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki would successively lead elected Iraqi
governments as Prime Minister.
SCIRI was founded in 1982 in Tehran by the prominent Shi'i cleric
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim with the funding and assistance of
the Iranian government.' 0 Its party militia, the Badr Corps, was trained by
Iran to conduct periodic raids into Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The scion
of a family of prominent Najafi clerics, Hakim never fully set forth his
political vision for post-Saddam Iraq. Though at one point he had
expressed support for Khomeini's doctrine of the rule of the jurist, wilayat
al-faqih (a position that deviated from that of the traditionally quietist Najaf
clergy), he had also publicly embraced democracy as the preferred regime
for post-war Iraq."I Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was assassinated in Najaf
7. For more background on the Shi'i religious parties, see Juan Cole, The Iraqi Shiites:
On the History ofAmerica's Would-Be Allies, Boston Rev., Oct.-Nov. 2003, at 21, available
at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.5/cole.html.
8. Fouad Ajami, The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in
Iraq 93, 225 (2006).
9. For the best examination of the range of religious Shi'i opinions on federalism
before the war, see Reidar Visser, Shi'i Perspectives on a Federal Iraq: Territory,
Community, and Ideology in Conceptions of a New Iraqi Polity, in Oil in the Gulf:
Obstacles to Democracy and Development 125 (Daniel Heradstveit & Helge Hveem eds.,
2004).
10. For a profile of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, and a broader pre-war
account of the Shi'i Islamist opposition, see Jon Lee Anderson, Dreaming of Baghdad: An
Opposition Leader Waits for War, New Yorker, Feb. 10, 2003, at 58.
11. The democratic bonafides of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) have been repeatedly called into question by some commentators, in part due to
Hakim's alleged support for Iranian-style theocratic rule. See Cole supra note 7; see also
Iraq Transition-The Way Ahead (Part II): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel.,
108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Hoover Inst., Stanford
Univ.), available at http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2004/Diamond
Testimony040519.pdf. But it is important to recognize that until the 2003 war, Hakim
operated from Tehran under the protection of the Iranian government. From the time he
returned to Iraq in May 2003 until his death in August 2003, he expressed support for
democracy in Iraq, and since then SCIRI has consistently pursued a democratic political
platform (albeit while retaining the Badr Corps as an armed militia force independent of
democratic control). Indeed, it is hard to imagine why SCIRI would have permitted Iraq's
democratic constitution to be so difficult to amend if, as some allege, the party's long-term
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in August 2003, leaving his brother 'Abd al-'Aziz to assume leadership of
SCIRI. 12 The younger brother would follow a pragmatic course throughout
the post-war period, participating fully in Iraq's political transition and
playing the lead role in representing Shi'i Islamist interests in the
constitutional discussions.
Also central to the Iraqi opposition were the two main Kurdish political
organizations, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Mas'ud
Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani.
Following the Gulf War, these leaders began constructing a quasi-
autonomous regional government in Northern Iraq, funded by oil revenues
administered by the United Nations and protected by American airpower.
The KDP and PUK were bitter rivals, and despite their INC membership,
they fought an internal Kurdish civil war between 1994 and 1996. In the
post-invasion constitutional discussions, however, Barzani and Talabani
presented a powerful and united front in defense of federalism and other
Kurdish interests. They also provided a consistent voice in favor of
secularism, fearing the rise of a Shi'i Islamist dictatorship to replace
Saddam's secular tyranny.
Finally, the original INC coalition also included a series of secular parties
and independents. Most prominent among these was Ahmad Chalabi, who
was chosen to lead the INC's Executive Council. 13 Born into a prominent
Baghdad merchant family, Chalabi fled Iraq in the wake of the military
coup of 1958 as a young teenager.14 A mathematician by training and
banker by profession, Chalabi would become a brilliant if opportunistic
political strategist and dealmaker. 15 A secular democrat and by identity a
Shi'i, he balanced his appeal to American officials with efforts to cultivate
ties to Iran and the Shi'i religious parties. Chalabi's main rival among
secular exiles was Iyad 'Allawi, a reputed former Ba'thist intelligence agent
who had turned against Saddam Hussein in the 1970s.16 Also a Shi'i Arab,
'Allawi boasted credibility with Sunnis disaffected with the regime; he also
provided extensive contacts in Iraqi military and intelligence circles.
'Allawi's Sunni connections were of considerable value, given the overall
imbalance of the INC in favor of Kurds and Shi'is. Both men would later
assume leading roles in the post-Saddam political structures, and from June
aim is to transform Iraq into an Islamic theocracy. On the amendment process, see Iraq
Const. art. 122.
12. For the consequences of the assassination, see Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq:
War and the Ethics of Nation Building 38-39 (2004). For a profile of the younger Hakim,
see Jon Lee Anderson, The Candidate, New Yorker, Feb. 2, 2004, at 50.
13. For a profile of AhmadChalabi, see Jane Mayer, The Manipulator, New Yorker,
June 7, 2004, at 58. On his role in promoting the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, see Peter
W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End
84-87 (2006).
14. See Mayer, supra note 13, at 62.
15. See id.
16. For a profile of lyad 'Allawi, see Jon Lee Anderson, A Man of the Shadows, New
Yorker, Jan. 24, 2005, at 56.
[Vol. 75
2006] CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND TEXT IN THE NEW IRAQ 889
2004 through March 2005 'Allawi would serve as Prime Minister of the
appointed Iraqi Interim Government.
The purpose of the Iraqi opposition, of course, was to promote the
downfall of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'thist regime in Baghdad, using
whatever political, military, intelligence, propaganda, and other means at
their disposal. The INC announced its political vision for a post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq following its initial 1992 meeting at Salah ad-Din, when the
leading parties adopted a series of principles enshrined in the initial INC
Articles of Association. 17 The Articles called for building "a system of
government that respects human rights and [is] democratic, federal,
pluralistic, and parliamentary in the context of constitutional institutions
within the rule of law and an independent judiciary."' 8 They pledged to "be
guided by all that is noble and humane in the history of mankind and
civilization especially the tenets of Islam and its compassionate and
benevolent values; Islam is the religion of the State."' 9 The Articles further
emphasized the importance of "cultural and political pluralism," and
reinforced the group's commitment to "[t]he ballot box" as the "arbiter of
legitimacy in any future government or regime through free, direct and
honest elections conducted through secret ballot."
20
These core ideas--democracy, Islam, federalism, pluralism, and human
rights--constituted the stated program of the Iraqi opposition parties, both
before and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In developing them, the
opposition was encouraged and supported by the U.S. government,
especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. From late 2001
through early 2003, as the U.S. government moved towards war against
Saddam Hussein, it also increased its outreach to the opposition, sponsoring
a series of formal political meetings and smaller roundtable discussions for
opponents of the regime. The Americans hoped not only to stimulate
thinking on post-war political reconstruction, but also to show that Iraq's
liberation would be a joint operation supported by the Iraqi people
themselves, and that it would serve the interests of democracy. 2' The
INC's core political principles were repeatedly reaffirmed (albeit in slightly
different language) in the main political statements issued by the Iraqi
opposition in the run-up to the war.22
17. See Iraqi Nat'l Cong. (INC), The Articles of Association of the Iraqi National
Congress, (Oct. 31, 1992) [hereinafter INC Articles of Association], available at
http://inciraq.com/English/1NC/1992%201NC%2OArticles%20of'/20AssociationEn.htm
(unofficial translation).
18. Id. art. 1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. For a personal account of U.S. efforts to cultivate the Iraqi opposition before the
war, see David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (2005).
22. See, e.g., Political Statement of the Iraqi Opposition Conference in London,
Kurdistan Observer, Dec. 19., 2002, available at http://home.cogeco.ca/-konews/20-12-02-
political-statement-london-conference.html; Final Statement, Meeting of the Coordination
and Follow-Up Committee Held in Salahaddin, 26 February-I March, 2003,
http://www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/final-statement.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2006). One
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Despite its best efforts, the Iraqi opposition never developed into an
effective political or military tool against the regime. A series of failed
military coups and the Kurdish in-fighting of the mid-1990s ended any
serious hope for an opposition-led regime change in Baghdad. It was only
the events of September 11-and the personal ties that Chalabi had
developed with leading American neoconservatives, by then firmly
ensconced in the Bush Administration-that would raise the Iraqi
opposition's profile as a potential partner in an American effort to replace
the Ba'thist dictatorship. Thus, despite lacking any ability to topple the
regime on its own, the opposition would be given the chance to implement
its core political principles in the constitutional process to take place in
post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
B. Occupation
Baghdad fell to Coalition forces on April 9, 2003.23 Some three months
later, with the blessing and assistance of the United Nations, the American-
led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally established the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC), which would serve alongside the CPA as the
chief Iraqi political entity throughout the period of formal occupation.24 All
of the major opposition parties and personalities from before the war-
including SCIRI's 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, Da'wa's Jaafari, Chalabi,
'Allawi, and the Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani-were named to
leading roles. 25 Also joining the IGC were several Sunni Arabs who had
been wary of involvement with the opposition movement before the war.
possible counterexample to this trend was the Final Report of the Democratic Principles
Working Group, a group of Iraqi oppositionists organized by the U.S. State Department to
consider issues relating to a democratic transition in Iraq. The report's strikingly secular
outlook is most likely due to the influence of its primary author, the Iraqi writer Kanan
Makiya. It was never given the formal blessing of the Iraqi political parties. See Democratic
Principles Working Group, U.S. Dep't of State, Final Report on the Transition to Democracy
in Iraq, (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/transition-to_
democracy.pdf; see also George Packer, The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq 66-99
(2005); Phillips, supra note 21, at 77-87, 94-95.
23. Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Forces Take Control in Baghdad; Bush Elated; Some
Resistance Remains, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2003, at AI.
24. Several days after it was established, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) released a
"Political Statement" which again reaffirmed the substantive constitutional principles that
had been embraced by the opposition in exile. See IGC, Political Statement (July 2003) (on
file with the Fordham Law Review). The Council wrote that among its key objectives were
the following:
Laying down the foundation for a pluralistic federal democratic system that insures
public liberties, freedom of opinion and expression, respect of human rights,
respect for the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people, respect for
women['s] rights and enhancement of the judiciary and guaranteeing its
independence; and above all to launch the democratic process to adopt a
permanent constitution for the country.
Id.
25. On the IGC, see Feldman, supra note 12, at 108-12. On the international legal basis
for the IGC, see S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); S.C. Res. 1500,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003).
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Most prominent among them were Adnan Pachachi, an elder statesman who
had served as Iraq's Foreign Minister in the 1960s, and Muhsin 'Abd al-
Hamid, the Secretary General of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni group that
had been operating inside Iraq. The twenty-five members of the IGC chose
these figures (together with the respected Shi'i cleric Muhammad Bahr al-
'Ulum) to serve as their rotating, nine-man presidential council.
As it began its work, the most pressing task facing the IGC was to
establish a process for drafting a new Iraqi constitution and holding
elections. There was never any question that a new constitution would need
to be written from scratch.26 Under the leadership of U.S. Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer, the CPA initially envisioned that a representative assembly of
Iraqis from around the country would write a new constitution, which
would subsequently be ratified in a national referendum. Elections would
then be held pursuant to the new constitution, after which the CPA would
dissolve and power would be transferred to the elected Iraqi government. 27
At the time, some of the newly named IGC members objected that delaying
the transfer of formal authority to an elected government until after the new
constitution had been approved and elections held would take too long.
They did not, however, initially object to the notion of an unelected body
actually performing the drafting.
On June 30, however, two weeks before the formation of the IGC, the
CPA's constitutional plan came under direct challenge from outside the
group of former exiles and others who would comprise the IGC. Grand
Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani, the most prominent Shi'i cleric in Iraq, issued a
fatwa declaring that any constitution not drafted by a democratically elected
body would be "unacceptable." 28 The fatwa signaled a new era of Shi'i
26. The IGC members deemed the Ba'thist "provisional constitution" of 1970, which
was still in effect with amendments proposed by Saddam Hussein in 1990, as clearly beyond
the pale, and no serious consideration was given to readopting Iraq's monarchical
constitution of 1925 (or, for that matter, its military constitution of 1958). For an overview
of Iraq's troubled constitutional history, see Nathan J. Brown, Constitutionalism,
Authoritarianism, and Imperialism in Iraq, 53 Drake L. Rev. 923 (2005).
27. Since well before the war, the Bush Administration's political planning had always
assumed that the new constitution would be written before holding elections, which would
take far too long to organize. From the start, L. Paul Bremer operated on this assumption,
especially after an extensive assessment conducted by the United Nations in the summer of
2003 confirmed that it would take close to a year to prepare for elections. See L. Paul
Bremer III, Iraq's Path to Sovereignty, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 2003, at A2 1. This CPA plan
was generally consistent with the constitutional process proposed by the report of the State
Department-organized Future of Iraq Project, in particular in its decision to hold national
elections only after a new constitution had been written. See Democratic Principles Working
Group, supra note 22, at 13-14.
28. The relevant portion of thefatwa read as follows:
Those forces [the Coalition] have no jurisdiction whatsoever to appoint members
of the Constitution preparation assembly. Also there is no guarantee either that
this assembly will prepare a constitution that serves the best interests of the Iraqi
people or express their national identity whose backbone is sound Islamic religion
and noble social values. The said plan is unacceptable from the outset. First of all
there must be a general election so that every Iraqi citizen-who is eligible to
vote-can choose someone to represent him in a foundational Constitution
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religious influence in Iraq's transitional political process.2 9 Motivated in
part by the concern that the United States would impose a constitution as it
had in post-war Japan in the 1940s, Sistani sought to prevent the use of this
tactic in Iraq. 30 He also wanted to ensure that the drafting body would
reflect Iraq's demographics and, most important of all, its majority-Shi'i
population.31 Sistani worded his pronouncement brilliantly, in democratic
language devoid of sectarianism. It essentially hoisted the Americans by
their own petard, putting them in the uncomfortable position of seeming to
oppose elections, despite having purportedly launched the war to advance
democratic principles.
It also reflected an important step in the gradual development of Sistani's
unique brand of political theory.32 The quietism that had been his hallmark
while Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein began to give way to a more
activist approach, in which the authority of the marja' at-taqlid, or senior
authoritative Shi'i jurist, could be invoked with respect to questions of
constitutional structure. This kind of intervention fell very far short of the
rule by the jurist envisioned under Khomeini's theories and embodied to a
greater or lesser extent in various versions of the Iranian constitution.
Sistani was in no way dictating ordinary policy nor purporting to review
political decisions. He was, however, offering a binding legal opinion,
couched in democratic theory, on the legitimate structures of constitution
making. This degree of involvement in constitutional politics would cast a
long shadow over subsequent constitutional negotiations.
preparation assembly. Then the drafted Constitution can be put to a referendum.
All believers must insist on the accomplishment of this crucial matter and
contribute to achieving it in the best way possible.
Letter from Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Al-Husseini A1-Sistani to a Group of Believers
(June 26, 2003), available at http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/ir5.htm.
29. See Noah Feldman, The Democratic Fatwa: Islam and Democracy in the Realm of
Constitutional Politics, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 1-9 (2005).
30. L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to
Build a Future of Hope 94 (2006).
31. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to overestimate the vehemence with which the Shi'i
political and clerical leadership insisted on obtaining a numerical majority in virtually all of
Iraq's transitional institutions-from the IGC (and its nine-man Presidential Council), to the
initial cabinet, to the Iraqi Interim Government appointed in June 2004. Many
commentators have blamed the CPA for imposing ethnic and sectarian quotas on the Iraqi
people (and hence enflaming intercommunal tensions), but this criticism misses the fact that
allocating posts roughly in proportion to estimated demographic realities was, quite simply, a
political necessity. For an example of this criticism, see Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The
Saban Ctr. for Middle E. Policy at the Brookings Inst., Analysis Paper No. 7, A Switch in
Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq 54 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/analysis/20060215-iraqreport.pdf.
32. For more on Sistani's political thought, Iraq's homegrown Shi'i clergy, and their
relationship to the Shi'i political parties, see Ajami, supra note 8, at 87-108; Reuel Marc
Gerecht, The Islamic Paradox: Shiite Clerics, Sunni Fundamentalists, and the Coming of
Arab Democracy 17-43 (2004); Juan Cole, The United States and Shi 'ite Religious Factions
in Post-Ba 'athist Iraq, 57 Middle East J. 543 (2003); Reidar Visser, Norweigan Inst. of Int'l
Affairs, Paper No. 700, Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to
Machiavellianism? (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/700.pdf.
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For the Americans, the fatwa posed an acute practical problem. It
seemed likely to delay the start of the constitutional process by nine to
twelve months, the period U.N. experts estimated it would take to organize
and hold national elections. 33 Meeting Sistani's demand, while holding to
the CPA's proposed sequence of transitional events (constitution first, then
referendum and elections, and finally transfer of authority to a sovereign
Iraqi government) would result in a formal occupation lasting nearly two
years.34 For American officials eager to transfer authority to an Iraqi
government that would be formally recognized as legitimate and sovereign
by the international community, this was far too long to wait.
As a result, for nearly six months, the IGC and CPA desperately-and, in
retrospect, mistakenly-sought to craft an alternative to direct elections that
would satisfy the terms of Sistani'sfatwa while allowing the constitutional
drafting process to begin immediately. Even the Shi'i Islamist members of
the IGC closest to Sistani sought a solution short of direct elections. They
too hoped to end the American occupation on as short a timetable as
possible.35
At the root of the decision not to comply immediately with thefatwa was
a fundamental lack of appreciation, among both Americans and Iraqi
leaders, of the popular influence wielded by the Shi'i clerical leadership,
and by Sistani in particular. For decades in Iraq, dictatorial, Sunni-
dominated regimes had brutally suppressed the country's Shi'i clerics,
forcing them to keep quiet and depriving them of any role in Iraqi political
life.36 Before the war, U.S. officials (along with many, though not all,
outside experts) had failed to grasp the extent to which large segments of
Iraqi society would look to the clerical hierarchy for guidance in the power
vacuum that followed Saddam Hussein's rule. U.S. officials believed that
Iraq was far more secular than the Iranian theocracy, and that in any case
the traditionally quietist Iraqi clergy would choose to remain outside the
political sphere. 37 Bush Administration officials advocated the growth of a
33. Bremer with McConnell, supra note 30, at 164.
34. Id.
35. Indeed, for months after the fatwa, prominent members of SCIRI along with key
Shi'i politicians with ties to Sistani, including Mowaffaq al-Rubaiee and Ahmed Chalabi,
repeatedly proposed options for forming a constitutional convention that were well short of
meeting Sistani's demand for direct, national elections.
36. See Ajami, supra note 8, at 87-108.
37. On this general point, see Feldman, supra note 12, at 79; Noah Feldman, Imposed
Constitutionalism, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 857, 865-68, 875-78 (2005). For examples of American
officials and experts underestimating the importance of Islam and the clerical leadership, see
Pollack, supra note 5, at 400-02; Wurmser, supra note 5, at 70-79; Daniel L. Byman and
Kenneth M. Pollack, Democracy in Iraq?, Wash. Q., Summer 2003, at 122; Interview by
Melissa Block, Nat'l Pub. Radio, with Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def. (Feb. 19,
2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02202003-t0219npr.html.
A leading neoconservative statement of the case for war did not even mention the
importance of the Shi'i clergy at all. See Lawrence F. Kaplan & William Kristol, The War
Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission (2003). Finally, it is worth noting
that the news media also failed to grasp the significance of the Shi'i clergy before the war.
A search of the Lexis-Nexis English language news database, for example, reveals that in the
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democracy in Muslim Iraq, but hoped and expected it to resemble the
Turkish model of state secularism. 38  Secular and westernized Iraqi
opposition leaders, particularly Ahmad Chalabi, also encouraged this view
among American leaders and experts.
Ultimately, despite the entreaties of Iraqis and Americans alike, Sistani
refused to budge from his constitutional fatwa.39 The debate came to a
head in November 2003, when the CPA and Iraqi political leaders finally
concluded that Sistani's demands would simply be impossible to
circumvent. Together, they produced a new plan consistent with thefatwa,
and IGC officials consulted with Najaf to ensure that the new proposals
would be acceptable. At the time, Sistani gave his private endorsement to
the plan (though he would later raise a new series of objections to a number
of its key elements). 40 On November 15, 2003, the CPA and IGC formally
announced the new constitutional process.4 1 The most important change
was to the sequence of events. According to the new transition timetable,
the IGC would write an interim constitution by March 2004. This interim
constitution would go into effect following the establishment of a sovereign
Iraqi government in June 2004. It would guarantee a federal, democratic,
and pluralistic Iraq that respected human rights.42 National elections would
year before the war-a time in which there was great interest in and discussion of Iraqi
politics, culture, and society-a grand total of thirty-three news articles made any mention of
Sistani (in contrast to 1195 mentioning Ahmad Chalabi in the same period, and 15,895
articles mentioning Sistani in the two years following the invasion).
38. On Turkey as a possible model for Muslim democracy, see Douglas Jehl & David E.
Sanger, U.S. Tells Iran Not to Interfere in Iraq Efforts, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2003, at Al
(quoting White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer); Interview by Turkish TV with Sec'y of
State, Colin L. Powell, in Ankara, Turkey (Apr. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19364.htm; Dr. Condoleezza
Rice, Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Briefing in Washington, D.C. (May 14, 2003), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/20558.htm; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., Remarks in
Arundel House, London, England (Dec. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20021202-depsecdef.html.
39. Iraqi political leaders routinely traveled to Najaf to meet with Sistani and discuss
constitutional matters. Despite numerous initiatives by the CPA, Sistani never met directly
with American officials, though he and Bremer did exchange oral and written messages on a
relatively frequent basis. See Bremer with McConnell, supra note 30, at 166-67, 271-73,
301-04, 364, 380-82.
40, Id. at 229. CPA officials were understandably frustrated with the new round of
Sistani objections, which included a demand that the transitional government to take power
in June 2004 be directly elected, instead of being chosen through a decentralized process of
provincial caucuses. This demand was entirely new, as the original fatwa had only
concerned the selection mechanism for the constitutional drafting body. See id. at 240. His
complaints about the unelected nature of the transitional government would ultimately be
assuaged by a high-level delegation from the United Nations led by former Algerian Foreign
Minister Lakdhar Brahimi.
41. See id. at 231-33, 243; Agreement on Political Process between Coalition
Provisional Authority and Governing Council of Iraq (Nov. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/iraq/cpa03a.htm.
42. It is striking that the political principles set forth in the November 15 agreement-
unlike the various opposition statements before the war, and the IGC's own political
statement issued in July---did not include any mention of Islam or Islamic values. This was
an accidental oversight, and was objected to by Shi'i Islamists in the days following the
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be held as soon as possible, and the elected assembly would proceed to
draft a new permanent constitution.
Shortly after signing the November 15 agreement, the IGC established a
drafting committee to begin work on the interim constitution, or, as it was
formally called to avoid breaching Sistani's fatwa, the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL).43 Adnan Pachachi, who had been chosen to
chair the committee, and KDP representatives immediately tabled rival
drafts of the document. Both versions proved problematic, however, and
neither would serve as the basis for the final TAL. Soon, discussions in the
committee became bogged down over the issue of federalism-in no small
part due to the hard-line demands of its Kurdish members, whose inflexible
drive for maximum autonomy in Northern Iraq was anathema to virtually
all of the ethnic Arabs on the IGC.
In early January, the drafting committee adjourned for several weeks. At
the urging of Iraqis on all sides of the political spectrum, Bremer began a
series of side discussions with the Kurds to prepare draft TAL language on
federalism, for subsequent consideration by the IGC. 44  Separately,
Pachachi's chief aide on the constitutional process, an Iraqi-American
lawyer named Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, initiated a set of small, informal
consultations together with Salem Chalabi (Ahmad Chalabi's nephew and
principal deputy on constitutional matters) and CPA officials to prepare a
"Chairman's Draft" of the document essentially from scratch.45 Pachachi
hoped to introduce this draft to the full IGC with CPA backing. Istrabadi's
discussions focused primarily on nuts-and-bolts issues that were not
deemed politically contentious-mechanisms for government formation,
phrasing on human rights guarantees, structure of the judiciary, etc.
Ultimately, both sets of discussions proved successful. By mid-February,
Pachachi circulated a sixty-four article draft constitution incorporating
Bremer's agreement with the Kurds (which had already been vetted with
IGC Arabs) and the more technical provisions worked out by Istrabadi's
staff-level discussions.
In the final two weeks of February, the Governing Council worked day
and night to finish the TAL on schedule. As the February 28 deadline
agreement (despite the fact that none of them had proposed such language when negotiating
the document). Bremer made clear to the Islamists that there could indeed be a formal place
for Islam in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), and on December 2, 2003, he sent a
secret letter to Sistani highlighting and confirming this point.
43. No definitive account of the TAL drafting process has yet been written. Thus far,
the best discussions of the TAL can be found in Bremer with McConnell, supra note 30, at
286-308; Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled
Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq 140-78 (2005); Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Reviving
Constitutionalism in Iraq: Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 269 (2006).
44. For more details on the Bremer-Kurd deal, see Diamond, supra note 43, at 161-71;
Int'l Crisis Group, Iraq's Kurds: Towards an Historic Compromise?, Middle East Rep.,
Apr. 8, 2004.
45. On these talks, see Diamond, supra note 43, at 144-61.
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approached, the Council hammered out compromises on the dozen or so
remaining contentious issues, including the structure and powers of the
executive branch, the role of Islam, and the procedures for ratifying the
permanent constitution. It was in this late phase of the negotiations that the
Shi'i Islamist parties, led by SCIRI, began pressing hard for a series of
demands that would enhance the TAL's commitment to Islam and
strengthen its majoritarian bent. This effort bore fruit, as the Shi'i bloc won
many key substantive changes to the draft. The modifications included a
prohibition on laws contravening Islam, a stronger role for the National
Assembly (which would undoubtedly include a Shi'i majority), and
assurances that any agreement on federalism would not preclude the future
formation of additional regions in Shi'i areas of the country.
The TAL process ended in the early morning hours of March 1, when an
exhausted Iraqi Governing Council unanimously agreed on a final draft. At
SCIRI's insistence, all decisions throughout the TAL negotiations had been
made by consensus. The vote to approve the document was literally the
only vote taken throughout the entire process. Despite the agreement, in the
days that followed, Sistani once again raised a new set of objections to the
TAL. His central complaint was a TAL provision, added at the last minute,
which granted the Kurds (or any group of three Iraqi provinces) the right to
block adoption of a permanent constitution if two-thirds of their populations
voted to reject the document in the ratification referendum.46 This time, the
Shi'i Islamists resisted Sistani's demand. After flocking to Najaf, they won
Sistani's grudging agreement that they could sign the document, albeit with
"reservations."
The IGC formally signed the TAL on March 8, in a ceremony at the
Baghdad Convention Center. The final document enacted-at least on an
interim basis-the political vision of the prewar Iraqi opposition. It was
fundamentally democratic, while also making clear the prominence of Islam
in Iraqi politics and society. It protected human rights, while establishing
institutional mechanisms that created the separation of powers and multiple
checks and balances. The TAL also set forth a proto-settlement on
federalism in which the Kurds would generally retain their existing
autonomy, while acknowledging exclusive central authority over national
finance, foreign and defense policy, and natural resources.
In the wake of its final approval, Sistani continued to signal his
unhappiness with the interim charter. In June, he intervened to prevent its
incorporation in the U.N. Security Council Resolution formally recognizing
46. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) art.
61(C). This article relies on the English translation of the TAL produced by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, which is available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment/TAL.html.
Sistani was entirely unsympathetic to Kurdish demands for constitutional safeguards, as
evidenced in a strongly worded message he passed to Bremer on March 5. See Bremer with
McConnell, supra note 30, at 303-04.
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the sovereign Iraqi government established in June 2004.4 7 Nonetheless,
that government formally supported and upheld the TAL, as did the
subsequent Iraqi government elected in 2005. In this respect, the TAL
served its purpose of providing a legal framework for Iraq's political
transition. It would also prove to be a baseline and starting point for
negotiations over the permanent constitution the following year.
C. Sovereignty
After the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government in June 2004, the
next major step in Iraq's constitutional process was the election of a
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) on January 30, 2005. Under the
procedures established in the TAL, the TNA would prepare a draft of the
permanent constitution by August 15; the draft would then be presented for
popular ratification in a national referendum by October 15.48 The outcome
of the election was therefore critical; it would define a new political balance
of power that would shape the permanent constitutional negotiations.
On February 17, 2005, the Iraqi electoral commission certified the final
results of the January 30 election. The Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a
fractious coalition of Shi'i religious parties (including SCIRI, Da'wa, and
representatives of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr) that had been cobbled
together under the general guidance of Sistani and his advisors, won over
half of the 275 total seats. A joint KDP-PUK Kurdish bloc took the second
largest grouping of seventy seats. Secular liberals had made a far more
disappointing showing, as incumbent Prime Minister Iyad 'Allawi won only
forty (and incumbent President Ghazi al-Yawer only five) delegates to the
Parliament. The most problematic feature of the results, however, was the
near-total absence of Sunni Arab delegates in the TNA. The Sunni
community had essentially boycotted the election-an action that would
leave it without qredible voices at the constitutional negotiating table over
the months to come. 49
On May 10, 2005, the TNA established a fifty-five member
Constitutional Drafting Committee to begin work on the document. 50 To
chair the Committee, which included delegates from all political parties, the
UIA proposed SCIRI official Humam al-Hammudi, a Shi'i cleric who had
47. See Letter from Office of Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani to President, U.N. Sec'y Council
(June 6, 2004), available at http://www.sistani.org/messages/eng/bay8.htm; Dexter Filkins,
Kurds Threaten to Walk Away from Iraqi State, N.Y. Times, June 9, 2004, at Al.
48. See TAL art. 61 (A)-(B).
49. See Jonathan Morrow, U.S. Inst. of Peace, Special Report No. 155, Iraq's
Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost 6 ( Nov. 2005).
50. As with the TAL, no comprehensive account of the Iraqi constitutional drafting
process has yet appeared. For some early fragmentary overviews, see Int'l Crisis Group,
Middle East Briefing No. 19, Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry (Sept.
26, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703&l=1 (Web site
registration required for a PDF of the full report); Morrow, supra note 49.
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been actively involved in the prewar opposition abroad. 51 Before the
January election, Shi'i and Kurdish leaders had announced their intent to
incorporate Sunni representatives in the drafting process, regardless of
whether they participated in the vote. After the committee was formed, the
United States pressured them to fulfill their promise. Following weeks of
negotiation, on June 16 Iraqi leaders announced that fifteen Sunni
representatives from outside the Parliament would join the committee, with
full voting rights. 52
The substantive constitutional negotiations that continued throughout the
summer of 2005 replayed many of the same debates that had come before.
Once again, the basic, core principles embraced by the Iraqi opposition and
enshrined in the TAL-Islam, democracy, federalism, pluralism, and
human rights-continued to garner support, especially from the UIA and
Kurdish leaders who dominated the drafting process. 53 Nonetheless, the
participants thoroughly reargued the ways in which these basic principles
would be reflected in the text. Shi'i leaders pushed again to strengthen
Islam's formal role in Iraqi governance; they also sought to add language
recognizing the exalted place of Shi'i leaders and holy sites.
Unsurprisingly, these efforts provoked strong resistance from the Kurds,
liberals, and secular nationalists.. For its part, the United States lobbied
negotiators to ensure that a larger role for Islam would not impinge upon
religious freedom, women's rights, or an independent Iraqi judiciary.
Islam was by no means the most contentious issue in the constitutional
talks. The strongest disagreements concerned the status and evolution of
Iraqi federalism, and, in particular, the creation of new federal regions
outside of Iraqi Kurdistan. In a marked shift from their relative
ambivalence toward federalism during the TAL negotiations, Shi'i leaders
(with Kurdish support) now publicly insisted on the right to form new
federal regions of their own in Southern Iraq. This created a direct
confrontation with the Sunni representatives and with nationalists like Iyad
'Allawi, who argued that creating oil-rich federal regions in Southern Iraq
would leave the Sunni-dominated center without natural resources of its
own. Further regionalization, the nationalists feared, would lead to the
ultimate disintegration of a unified Iraqi state.54
Inexperienced, unelected, internally divided, and politically unrealistic in
their own positions, the Sunnis on the drafting body quickly alienated their
Shi'i and Kurdish colleagues. Unlike the other leading drafters, the Sunnis
had participated in neither the TAL process nor the talks of the prewar Iraqi
51. Indeed, Hammudi had served as Deputy President of the INC's Executive Council in
the early 1990s.
52. See Morrow, supra note 49, at 2.
53. Indeed, one element of the Shi'i-Kurd agreement to form a national-unity
government following the January 30 election was a decision to base the permanent
constitution on the principles and institutional mechanisms set forth in the TAL.
54. For an elaboration of the Sunni position, see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50, at 6-
9.
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opposition. They were both newcomers and outsiders; and worse, their
consent was not necessary to reaching a deal. Lacking democratic
legitimacy and a hierarchical structure capable of making commitments on
behalf of their community, the unelected Sunnis were generally kept at
arm's length during the substantive drafting. Indeed, to the extent Sunni
influence played any role in the process, it came through the mediation
efforts of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. 55
In early August 2005, Hammudi circulated a unified first draft of the
constitution, which compiled different sections prepared by various sub-
groups of the larger committee.56 Despite the existence of a full draft,
many key issues remained outstanding, including those relating to Islam
and federalism. Meanwhile, the August 15 drafting deadline was rapidly
approaching. With strong encouragement from Khalilzad, Iraqi leaders
opted not to extend the deadline by six months, which the TAL allowed if
necessary. 57 Instead, the senior Iraqi leadership agreed to press forward
with the talks, deciding that if extra time was needed, they would take
advantage of ambiguous phrasing in the TAL to institute a short delay.
5 8
As time grew short, the Iraqis bypassed the TNA drafting committee in
favor of smaller, ad hoc gatherings of Shi'i and Kurdish leaders. With
Khalilzad's facilitation, the leading factions gradually worked out a series
of compromises on key outstanding issues. In order to complete their work,
55. Khalilzad played an active role in brokering compromises in the constitutional talks,
beginning shortly after his initial arrival in Baghdad in late July 2005.
56. This essay makes reference to two drafts put forward in early August by the Shi'i-
dominated drafting committee led by Humam al-Hammudi. See Humam al-Hammudi, et al.,
Draft Constitution (Aug. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005)] (on
file with the Fordham Law Review); Humam al-Hammudi, et al., Draft Constitution (Aug. 8,
2005) [hereinafter Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 8, 2005)] (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). These drafts were significant because they pre-dated the serious, senior-level
constitutional bargaining outside the committee. As such, they reflect the strong influence of
the Shi'i Islamist parties, which were able to control the drafting process within the
committee.
57. See TAL art. 61(F).
58. Both Jonathan Morrow and the International Crisis Group have criticized the U.S.
government for its effort to keep Iraqis to the August 15 deadline. In their view, the deadline
should have been extended for several months in the beginning of August 2005. See
Morrow, supra note 49, at 8-15; Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50, at 1-5. One of the authors
of this essay publicly agreed with the criticism. See Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree in
Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 2005, at A19. At the time, senior U.S. officials believed that
extending the deadline would have simply postponed the serious senior-level political
negotiations that only began in earnest in the second week of August. Moreover, the
extension would have lengthened the period of Sunni exclusion from the democratic political
process (by requiring postponement of the December 2005 parliamentary election until after
completion of the constitution), without providing any guarantee that time would yield a
compromise acceptable to the Sunnis. Indeed, to the extent that Sunni opposition to the
constitution was premised on Shi'i demands concerning federalism, there was virtually zero
chance for a mutually acceptable compromise, since these demands reflected a clear Shi'i
redline in the discussions. Instead of invoking a lengthy formal delay under TAL Article
61(F), American officials encouraged short, de facto delays by supporting continued debate
and discussion well beyond the August 15 deadline. Indeed, as noted below, final
amendments to the draft were negotiated until just before the October 15 referendum.
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the TNA leadership relied upon a variety of legislative maneuvers allowing
for a series of short postponements of the deadline.
On August 28, Iraqi leaders announced the completion of a final
constitution. 59 While some important concessions had been made to Sunni
leaders (largely at the urging of the United States), the core of the document
reflected a political deal between the Shi'is and Kurds. On federalism, the
most important issue of all, the document accepted the basic Shi'i demand
to allow for future regionalization. 60 Sunni leaders accordingly denounced
the charter, launching a public campaign to encourage its defeat in the
referendum scheduled for October 15. In protest, some Sunnis even talked
of boycotting the referendum, along with the next set of parliamentary
elections that would follow in December.
In the weeks between the release of the final draft and the referendum,
Khalilzad met repeatedly with leaders from all factions in order to broker a
last-ditch agreement. His goal was to convince the Sunnis not to end their
participation in the very political process that they had only recently joined.
Days before the vote, the Iraqis announced a new compromise, in which
they agreed to form the Constitutional Review Commission within the first
Parliament to be elected under the new constitution.6 1 The Commission
would have the right to prepare proposals for constitutional amendments
which could subsequently be adopted under a simplified, expedited
ratification procedure. Ultimately, the last-minute deal allowed secular
liberals and some Sunnis to support the constitution's passage.
Despite the agreement, the final constitution only barely won approval
under the ratification procedures set forth in the TAL. In the Sunni-
dominated provinces of Anbar and Salah ad-Din, it was overwhelmingly
rejected (by over ninety-six percent and eighty-one percent of voters,
respectively).62 In Ninewa, too, it was rejected by forty-five percent of
those voting-but not by the two-thirds margin that, under TAL Article
61(C), 63 would have meant the constitution's failure overall. 64  On
December 15, two months after the referendum, Iraq held its next set of
elections. Despite their disappointment over the constitution, Sunni Arabs
participated in record numbers. Overall turnout was seventy-six percent,
59. See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50, at 2.
60. See Iraq Const. art. 112-17.
61. Robert F. Worth, Leaders in Iraq Agree to Change in Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 2005, at Al.
62. See Indep. Electoral Comm'n of Iraq, Certificate of the Constitutional Referendum
Final Results (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://ieciraq.org/English/Frameset-english.htm.
63. See TAL art. 61 (C).
64. See Indep. Electoral Comm'n of Iraq, Certificate of the Constitutional Referendum
Final Results (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://ieciraq.org/English/Frameset-english.htm.
A shift of 83,283 additional votes against the constitution in Ninewa would have led to its
rejection under Article 61(C) of the TAL. Some have argued that the last-minute agreement
to add the Constitutional Review Commission was decisive in ensuring passage of the
constitution by avoiding its defeat by the requisite two-thirds margin in Ninewa. For official
results in the constitutional referendum, see id.
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and Sunni political parties won close to sixty of a total 275 seats.65 As of
this writing, the Constitutional Review Commission has not yet begun its
work.
II. THE TEXT
Iraq's constitutional text embraces the basic principles of Islam,
democracy, human rights, pluralism, and federalism. These ideas were at
the core of a political consensus among the leading parties of the Iraqi
opposition, the Governing Council, and eventually the Transitional National
Assembly. Despite this general agreement among Iraqi leaders, however,
the precise constitutional phrasing, institutional mechanisms, and other
tradeoffs across the basic principles were the subject of hard political
bargaining and debate. On most substantive areas of the constitution-
particularly those relating to the role of Islam and the strength of Islamic
political trends-the discussions pitted Shi'i Islamist politicians against a
loose coalition of the Kurdish parties and more secular Arabs. 66 For their
part, American diplomats generally supported this latter group, but above
all sought to facilitate agreements across the factions and bring the
negotiations to completion on schedule. 67 The final settlement reflected the
considerable strength of the Islamists, who led the constitutional drafting
effort following their victory in the December 2005 elections.68
65. Indep. Electoral Comm'n of Iraq, Certification of the Council of Representatives
Elections Final Results 1 (Feb. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/IECI-Decision_CertifiedResultsofCoRelectionsEn.
pdf; see also Robert F. Worth, Top Coalitions Fall Just Short in Iraq Voting, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 2006, at Al.
66. This section refers repeatedly to these political groupings. The most important Shi'i
Islamists engaged in the discussions were the senior leaders of the Unified Iraqi Alliance
(UIA), including 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, Vice President Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, and Humam
Hammudi of SCIRI; Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari and Nuri al-Maliki of Da'wa; Nadim al-
Jabiry of the Fadilah Party; Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi; Transitional National
Authority (TNA) Deputy Speaker Hussein al-Shahristani; National Security Advisor
Mowaffaq al-Rubaiee; and various representatives of Moktada al-Sadr. The key Kurdish
negotiators included Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
leader Mas'ud Barzani, Deputy Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways, Minister of Planning
Barham Salih, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari, and Constitutional Drafting
Committee Deputy Chairman Fouad Masoum. As for the more secular Arabs, the leading
figures were former Prime Minister Iyad 'Allawi, President Ghazi al-Yawer, TNA Speaker
Hachem al-Hassani, Drafting Committee Deputy Chairman Adnan Janabi, and Adnan
Pachachi. As previously noted, the Sunni Arab bloc of representatives added to the Drafting
Committee from outside the National Assembly were not especially significant in shaping
constitutional outcomes outside of the federalism discussion. The leading Sunni negotiators
included Saleh Mutlaq and 'Abd al-Nasir al-Janabi of the National Dialogue Council, Tariq
al-Hashimi and Ayad al-Sammarae of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, and
Adnan Dulaimi.
67. On the ethics of American diplomatic engagement on Iraqi constitutional issues, see
Feldman, supra note 12.
68. Consider that beyond the Preamble, fourteen of the constitution's 139 total articles
make direct or indirect reference to Islam or religious values. Iraq Const. pmbl. & arts. 2, 3,
7, 10, 12, 14, 29, 35, 39, 40, 41,43, 48, 89.
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This section analyzes the key constitutional provisions which will shape
the role of Islamic law, values, and politics in Iraq's developing
constitutional order.6 9 In doing so, it examines the final text against the
backdrop of both the TAL (which provided a more limited role for Islam
than the permanent charter) and original proposals put forward by the
religious Shi'i parties. 70  Ultimately, the text reflects a series of
compromises establishing the basic structures of an Islamic democracy
while also allowing for the emergence of a wide range of interpretations and
practice. The constitutional text alone does not precisely or fully define the
relationship between Islam and democracy; this relationship will
accordingly develop over time, and is likely to be shaped as much by
subsequent political developments as by the text itself.
A. State and Religion
The most contentious debate over Islam's place in the Iraqi constitution
concerned the precise phrasing of Article 2, dealing with the formal
relationship between Islam and the state. The relevant section reads as
follows:
First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental
source of legislation.
A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be
established.
B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be
established.
C. No law that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in
this constitution may be established.
Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority
of the Iraqi people .... 71
As a general matter, this language parallels TAL Article 7, with some
subtle changes strengthening Islam's prominence in the constitution. 72 This
shift reflects the more powerful hand of the Shi'i Islamist parties in the
constitutional discussions. Nonetheless, it does not establish clear
69. For article-by-article examinations of the permanent constitution, see Nathan J.
Brown, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, The Final Draft of the Iraqi Constitution:
Analysis and Commentary (Sept. 16, 2005) available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptl6.pdf and U.S. Comm'n on Int'l
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Iraq's Permanent Constitution: Analysis &
Recommendations (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/
middleast/iraq/03212006_iraq.html.
70. The best article-by-article examinations of the TAL can be found in Istrabadi, supra
note 43, and Nathan J. Brown, Transitional Administrative Law: Commentary and Analysis
(Mar. 7-8, 2004), available at http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrownt/
interimiraqiconstitution.html
71. Iraq Const. art. 2.
72. See TAL art. 7. On the negotiations over this provision in the TAL, see Bremer with
McConnell, supra note 30, at 292, 298-99.
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guidelines on precisely how the Iraqi regime will rely upon Islam and
Islamic values in everyday governance. Several particular features of
Article 2 deserve elaboration.
First, like the Iraqi constitutions of 1925, 1958, and 1970 before it-and
indeed, like virtually every other Arab constitution-Iraq's charter formally
makes Islam the state religion. 73 This decision was entirely uncontroversial
in the negotiations. Indeed, the Iraqi opposition had accepted this principle
years earlier, at the Salah ad-Din conference in 1992, and the IGC had
incorporated it without sustained comment or debate in the TAL.74
Second, Article 2 identifies Islam as "a fundamental source" of
legislation. 75 This language goes a half-step beyond the TAL (in which
Islam was merely "a source" of legislation), 76 but not as far as the original
Shi'i demand that Islam be "the source" of legislation. 77 The importance of
this provision may well be chiefly symbolic, as it will lend moral support to
Iraqi politicians who wish to make explicitly religious arguments in favor of
proposed legislation. 78 The compromise formulation is designed to avoid
any implication, however, that Islam is the only source of law.
Third, Article 2 contains a noncontradiction clause barring laws which
contravene Islam's "established provisions." 79  The TAL contained a
similar clause, which the Shi'i Islamists demanded at the time in exchange
for changing "the source" to "a source" in the previous sentence.80 In the
debate over the permanent constitution, the Islamists sought to strengthen
the language beyond the TAL formulation. They did so by replacing the
TAL's restriction on laws violating the "provisions of Islam on which there
is consensus" (thawabit al-islam al-mujma' 'alayha) with one barring laws
violating "the provisions of the principles of Islam" (thawabit ahkam al-
73. Nathan J. Brown, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Debating Islam in Post-
Baathist Iraq 2 (Mar. 2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO13.Brown.FINAL2.pdf.
74. INCArticles ofAssociation, supra note 17, art. 1; TAL art. 7.
75. Iraq Const. art. 2.
76. TAL art. 7(A).
77. See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 1.
78. See Brown, supra note 73, at 3-4.
79. Iraq Const. art. 2.
80. Istrabadi, supra note 43, at 277. The evolution of this language during the TAL
negotiations may have been influenced by U.S. acquiescence to similar language in the
Afghan Constitution. See Afg. Const. art. 3 (2004), available at
http://www.jemb.org/eng/Legal%20Framework/Legislation%20oP/o20Reference/Constitutio
n/Constitution%20(English).pdf (unofficial English translation). In December, the TAL
drafting committee (including its Shi'i Islamist members) tentatively agreed to language on
Islam that did not include a noncontradiction clause. Meanwhile, on January 4, the Afghan
loya jirga formally approved a new constitution, which included the statement, "No law
shall contradict the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan." Id.
The Afghan constitution was formally signed and enacted into law by President Hamid
Karzai on January 26, 2004. Several days later, Shi'i Islamists on the drafting committee
began discussing the possible addition of a noncontradiction clause to the TAL, and SCIRI
put it forward as a formal demand on February 21. Ironically enough, the lead U.S. diplomat
involved in the Afghan constitutional discussions was Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who
would subsequently play the same role in the Iraqi constitutional process the following year.
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islam).81  With its reference to ahkam-which may be rendered as
"judgments" as well as "principles"-the new language has stronger legal
connotations than did its predecessor. 82 It may therefore be more easily
invoked by the Federal Supreme Court in striking down statutes deemed
incompatible with Islam, or by legislators arguing against such laws in
Parliament. Overall, however, the noncontradiction clause is highly
indeterminate. There is, needless to say, no clear shared understanding of
what constitutes "the provisions of the principles of Islam."
Paralleling Article 2's noncontradiction clause on Islam are two other
non-contradiction clauses, barring laws which violate the "principles of
democracy" and "the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this
constitution." 83 Elsewhere, the constitution makes clear that it is supreme
over ordinary federal or local statutes. 84 The liberal drafters of these
provisions sought to emphasize that democracy and human rights are as
fundamental to the constitution as Islam. Indeed, the parallel
noncontradiction clauses in this provision were a core part of the political
compromise on the role of Islam in the TAL.85 The Kurds and secular
Arabs-with backing from the United States-managed to head off Shi'i
Islamist attempts to remove these parallel clauses from the permanent
constitution. 86 As a practical matter, these clauses raise the possibility that
future interpretations of the Islamic noncontradiction clause would be
influenced by the principles of democracy, whatever these may be defined
to constitute. In any case, it cannot be maintained that the text of the
constitution privileges Islam over basic rights or democratic principles,
however uneasily they might sit beside each other under certain
circumstances.
Finally, Article 2 "guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the
Iraqi people." 87 This language is also an adaptation of the TAL, which had
established "respect" for Iraq's Muslim majority. 88 The change in verb
from "respect" to "guarantee" reflects the stronger hand of the Shi'i Islamist
81. Compare TAL art. 7(A), with Iraq Const. art. 2(I)(A). The translation here is the
authors' and differs slightly from the English translations of these documents cited
elsewhere. The CPA translation of TAL Article 7(a) makes reference to the "universally
agreed tenets of Islam," and the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) translation
of Article 2(l)(a) in the permanent constitution refers to "the established provisions of
Islam." See TAL art. 7(A), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/govemment/TAL.html; Iraq
Const. art. 2(1)(A), available at
http://www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/ConstitutionEng-UNs- 13.pdf.
82. See Brown, supra note 69, at 3.
83. Iraq Const. art. 2(l)(B)-(C).
84. Id. art. 13.
85. See TAL art. 7(A); Bremer with McConnell, supra note 30, at 299.
86. See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 1. The Shi'i Islamists
did, however, succeed in splitting the three noncontradiction clauses into separate
subsections of Article 2(1), instead of retaining the clauses in a single sentence, as in the
TAL. Compare Iraq Const. art. 2(1), with TAL art. 7.
87. Iraq Const. art. 2(2).
88. TAL art. 7(A).
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parties in the negotiations and arguably enhances the constitution's
symbolic embrace of Islam.
Beyond Article 2, the most contentious constitutional provision directly
relating to Islam's formal status in Iraqi law is Article 39, which states that
"Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to
their re-*igions, sects, beliefs, or choices and that shall be regulated by
law." 89 The provision is not clearly worded, but its intent was to change
Iraq's approach to laws governing personal status (governing marriage,
divorce, inheritance, etc.). In 1959, a newly installed Iraqi military regime
enacted a new personal-status law, drawing eclectically from a variety of
Sunni and Shi'i schools of Islamic jurisprudence, which would apply to all
Iraqis via the civil courts. 90 The law was then-and remains--enormously
controversial, in particular among leading Shi'i clerics. The critics have
objected to its patchwork embrace of disparate elements of different
jurisprudential traditions, its multiple departures from Islamic shari'a, and
its reliance on a Sunni-dominated judiciary for enforcement.
In December 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council (under the monthly
rotating presidency of SCIRI leader 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim) passed a
resolution purporting to abolish the 1959 personal-status law and replace it
with shari'a.91 This initiative was controversial inside Iraq, particularly
with women who preferred the 1959 law's relatively progressive approach
to divorce and inheritance. At the time, Bremer refused to give the IGC
resolution any legal force. Several months later, the IGC voted to repeal its
decision.92 The original law remained in effect, and the Shi'i Islamists did
not attempt to incorporate Islamic personal-status law in the TAL.
In 2005, the Shi'i Islamists again sought to replace the 1959 code with
shari'a, this time through the new constitution. The religious parties were
politically much stronger than before, and the Kurds and Iyad 'Allawi
proved unsuccessful in their bid to keep personal-status issues outside of the
constitution entirely. The final language of Article 39, however, did reflect
an important compromise. Instead of merely replacing the 1959 code with
shari'a, as originally proposed by the Islamists, the provision emphasized
that every Iraqi would have freedom to choose their personal-status law in
accordance with "their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices."93 This phrasing
89. Iraq Const. art. 39.
90. On the history of personal-status law in Iraq and the controversy sparked by the new
1959 law, see Feldman, supra note 12, at 108-11; Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the
Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 695, 748-54
(2004); Brown, supra note 73, at 4-7.
91. One of the most vocal Shi'i critics of the 1959 law, the cleric Mohammed Bahr al-
Ulum, who had published a searing critique in 196, was a member of the IGC at the time.
92. This repeal came at an unexpected moment to most IGC members and the CPA-in
the midst of the final, tense days of the TAL negotiations. See Bremer with McConnell,
supra note 30, at 293.
93. Iraq Const. art. 39. The Hammudi Draft Constitution circulated on August 7
stipulated that "the followers of every religion or sect are free in ... their commitment to
their personal status in accordance with their religious and sectarian beliefs." Hammudi
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sought explicitly to ensure not only that Shi'is, Sunnis, and Christians
would be able to follow their own faith traditions, but that secular Iraqis
would retain the option of following the 1959 civil code on matters of
personal status. Article 39 also declared that the provision would require
implementing legislation,94 thereby providing an additional check on the
modalities by which Islamic personal-status law will be incorporated and
applied.
As with other key provisions dealing with the role of Islam, it remains to
be seen how Article 39 will be implemented in practice. The most obvious
danger is that the freedom to choose one's own personal-status legal regime
will remain illusory, especially for women who are intimidated into
"choosing" shari'a and thereby casting aside important protections of the
1959 code. That said, a wide range of interpretations of the provision are
possible, as it contains no clear statement of what version(s) of shari'a will
be applied, how, and by whom, nor what would happen in case of conflict
between couples over which law ought to be applied.95 Here again, the
constitutional text does not definitively determine the relationship between
Islam and the Iraqi state.
In addition to Articles 2 and 39, there are numerous other constitutional
provisions reaffirming the important role of religion in Iraqi society. Such
provisions-acknowledging "God's due over us,' 9 6 recognizing the
importance of national religious leaders,97 affirming Iraq's membership in
the Islamic world,98 and giving affirmative protection to holy shrines and
religious sites 99 -were absent from the TAL. Most were included in the
permanent text at the initiative of the Shi'i Islamist political parties. While
all factions agreed to the final language, early proposals reflected a clear
sectarian Shi'i bent. At one point, for example, the Shi'i Islamist parties
had drafted language referring to Iraq's "Shi'i majority" and to the
importance of the Shi'i "marja'iyya" in Najaf. 100 Unsurprisingly, these
provisions were strongly opposed by Sunni and Kurdish members of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee. In the end, the Shi'i Islamists agreed to
drop these demands, reportedly following consultations with Sistani
himself. The symbolic provisions that remain in the constitution may or
may not have any practical significance. In any event, they reflect the deep
Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 9. This language was intended to impose
shari'a on Muslims. See id.
94. Iraq Const. art. 39. Indeed, as Nathan Brown has pointed out, Article 39 leaves open
whether (for those choosing the shari'a option), the law will be applied by civil courts,
religious courts, or some combination of both. See Brown, supra note 69, at 7.
95. See Isobel Coleman, Women, Islam, and the New Iraq, 85 Foreign Aff. 24, 24-38
(2006)
96. Iraq Const. pmbl.
97. Id.
98. Id. art. 3.
99. Id. art. 10.
100. Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 1-2.
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desire of Iraq's Shi'i leaders to emphasize the integration of religious
commitments and values into the country's political order.
B. Rights and Duties
Section two of Iraq's constitution sets forth an extensive list of "Rights
and Liberties," covering civil, political, economic, cultural, and social
freedoms. 1 1 This section of the constitution was not a source of major
controversy during the negotiations. 102 However, three important issues did
prove contentious-the individual right to freedom of religion, the scope of
women's rights, and the recognition of Iraq's obligations under
international human-rights treaties. Islamist politics played the key role in
shaping the debate on these issues. In each area, Shi'i Islamists sought to
cut back on the breadth of freedoms guaranteed by the TAL. Ultimately,
the Islamists failed in this effort, largely due to the strong opposition of the
Kurds and secular Arabs (backed strongly by the United States). Yet, while
the final constitution contains strong protections for individual rights across
the board, it remains to be seen how these rights will be enforced in
practice-especially if they are perceived as conflicting with Article 2's
embrace of Islamic values.
All Iraqis engaged in the constitutional negotiations believed in the
importance of protecting group rights to religious freedom. All recognized
that the Ba'thist dictatorship had unjustly persecuted and manipulated
various religious communities (including, above all, the Iraqi Shi'i
community), and all agreed that the constitution should prevent future
governments from interfering with any group's right to affirmatively
practice its particular religious tradition. The constitution includes multiple,
redundant guarantees of such rights.10 3
The individual right to religious freedom, by contrast, was much more
controversial. Such an individual right implies the right not to be religious
at all-or, even more problematic from an Islamic perspective, the right to
convert from Islam to other faiths. The Shi'i Islamists sought to scale back
the TAL's fairly extensive protection of individual religious freedom.
Whereas TAL Article 7 had guaranteed the full rights "of all individuals" to
freedom of religious belief and practice, 104 the Islamists proposed changing
the parallel clause in the permanent constitution to protect the right "of
101. Iraq Const. arts. 14-44.
102. Indeed, the rights protected in section two largely mirror those enshrined in the TAL.
See TAL arts. 10-23. The only difference, as some commentators have noted, is the addition
of language in the permanent constitution which appears to exercise the condition of certain
rights on their compatibility with "public morals," and also the requirement of implementing
legislation. See, e.g., Iraq Const. arts. 15-17, 22-24, 27, 30-32, 36; Brown, supra note 69, at
5-6. The danger that these qualifications may limit the scope of individual liberties is
mitigated, however, by article 44 of the constitution, which makes clear that such legislation
may not "violate the essence of the right or the freedom" at issue. Iraq Const. art. 44.
103. See, e.g., Iraq Const. arts. 2, 7, 41(1), 41(2).
104. See TAL art. 7.
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all . . . religions" to freedom of belief and practice. 10 5 Moreover, while
retaining the TAL ban on religious coercion of individuals, the Islamists
also proposed eliminating the individual right to "freedom of thought,
conscience, and religious belief and practice."' 106
These efforts ultimately failed, as Iraq's Kurdish and secular parties
effectively resisted the Shi'i Islamist proposals. The United States also
played an important role in urging the Shi'is to comnpromise on these
demands. President Bush personally called SCIRI leader 'Abd al-'Aziz al-
Hakim-the one time he personally intervened in the constitutional
negotiations-in part to register his own hope that the new constitution
would not restrict religious freedom.107 The final constitution restored the
TAL language protecting "the full religious rights of all individuals to
freedom of religious belief and practice."' 08  It also included a clear
statement that "[e]ach individual shall have the freedom of thought,
conscience and belief."109
A second contentious set of issues concerned the scope of women's
rights. Both the TAL and Iraq's final constitution contain general
guarantees of full equality for women. 110 In neither case were these
equality provisions controversial among the Iraqi drafters. Initially,
however, the Shi'i Islamist parties did resist incorporating one of the TAL's
central innovations on women's rights-the requirement that the electoral
law "shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than
one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly""I '-in the
permanent constitution. Adnan Pachachi and the Kurdish parties had
insisted on including this provision in the TAL; 112 it resulted in an Iraqi
Parliament containing eighty-six women (out of 275 total members). The
Islamists originally sought to remove the requirement altogether.11 3 When
the Kurds and secularists objected, the Islamists then sought to phase out
the quota after the first two election cycles. 114 This too failed. Finally, the
Islamists relented, agreeing to incorporate the quota, word-for-word from
the TAL, in Article 47 of the final constitution. 1 5
105. Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 1-2.
106. Compare TAL art. 13(F), with Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56,
at 1-2.
107. See Dexter Filkins & James Glanz, Shiites and Kurds Halt Charter Talks with
Sunnis, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2005, at Al.
108. Iraq Const. art. 2.
109. Id. art. 40.
110. See TAL art. 12; Iraq Const. art. 14.
111. TAL art. 30(C).
112. Diamond, supra note 43, at 156; Istrabadi, supra note 43, at 294. The Iraqi electoral
law implementing the quota requirement specified that at least every third candidate on each
political entity's candidate list be a woman. The overall distribution of seats across the
various lists ultimately resulted in a Parliament comprised of thirty-one percent women,
thereby surpassing the twenty-five percent target. See Istrabadi, supra note 43, at 295.
113. See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56.
114. See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 8, 2005), supra note 56, at 40.
115. See Iraq Const. art. 47.
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In early drafts of the constitution, the Shi'i Islamists also introduced a
provision addressing the public and private role of women in Iraqi
society.1 16 As originally phrased, it read as follows:
The State shall guarantee reconciliation between [a] woman's role
towards her family and her work in society, and her equality with men in
the life fields of politics, social affairs, culture, and economics in a way
that does not contradict the fundamental principles of this constitution. 1 1 7
Iraqi liberals objected overwhelmingly to this provision, which they feared
would condition women's equality on its compatibility with Islamic law.
The United States echoed these objections. Ultimately, the Islamists
dropped the provision from the text entirely.
A final area of contention in the constitution's treatment of individual
freedom was the extent to which the charter would commit Iraq to
respecting international human-rights conventions. As various scholars
have noted, many newly drafted constitutions have strengthened the
domestic status of human rights by referencing international law and treaty
obligations.1 8 International human-rights advocates have enthusiastically
embraced this strategy, which also helps transitioning countries position
themselves as responsible members of the international community. 119 The
TAL itself had taken this approach, declaring that the Iraqi people enjoyed
"the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other
instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has
acceded, and others that are deemed binding on it."' 120 These treaties
included both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).12'
116. Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 5.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties,
36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 211, 214-15 (1998); cf Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Int'l Org. 217, 217-
20 (2000).
119. Feldman, supra note 37, at 867-75.
120. TAL art. 23. In addition, the TAL preamble affirmed the Iraqi people's "respect for
international law" and highlighted Iraq's participation in founding the United Nations. Id. at
pmbl. The preamble was drafted by Pachachi aide Feisel Istrabadi, who would later serve as
Iraq's Deputy Representative to the United Nations. Pachachi himself is a committed
internationalist, and had served as Iraq's Representative to the U.N. in the 1960s. On the
TAL's embrace of international law, see Diamond, supra note 43, at 146, and Istrabadi,
supra note 43, at 289.
121. Iraq ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on
March 23, 1976, without submitting any reservations or declarations. It ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
on August 13, 1986, but submitted several reservations seeking to protect the role of shari'a,
in spite of the treaty provisions mandating gender equality. See Office of the U.N. High
Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human
Rights Treaties (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; USCIRF,
supra note 69, at 1-2, 4-5.
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In the debate over the permanent constitution, however, the Shi'i
Islamists sought to limit the scope of Iraq's international human-rights
commitments. Initially, they proposed narrowing the TAL provision to
apply only to human-rights treaties and agreements "that Iraq has ratified,"
and not to international law more broadly. 122 Moreover, the proposed
revision incorporated only those rights "that do not contradict the principles
and rulings of this constitution." 123 These changes aimed to subordinate
international human rights to Article 2's elevation of Islam. 124 At the last
minute, however, the Iraqis dropped the revised provision from the text
entirely. Nonetheless, Article 8 retained weaker, more generic language
declaring that "Iraq shall ... respect its international obligations."' 125 This
formulation presumably extends to the international rights treaties that Iraq
has signed.
In each of the areas examined above-religious freedom, women's
rights, and international human rights-Shi'i Islamists made concerted
efforts to restrict or qualify the protection of individual liberties, largely out
of a desire to ensure the primacy of Islamic values. In each case, they were
largely unsuccessful. Nonetheless, Article 2's noncontradiction clause
(and, more generally, its embrace of Islam as a source of law) are
potentially in tension with the constitution's sweeping guarantees of
individual freedom. The constitutional text does not explicitly resolve this
tension, which will be left to Iraqi legislators and judges to address in the
future.
C. Separation of Powers
The debate over the institutional structure of the federal government-
and, in particular, the balance of authority between the President, Prime
Minister, and National Assembly--did not explicitly address the role of
Islam. Nonetheless, the constitutional settlement in this area was
profoundly influenced by the politics of religion and denomination. Indeed,
the central question in the debate was the extent to which the Shi'i Islamist
political parties would be constrained, within Iraq's emerging democratic
constitutional framework, by counter-majoritarian checks and balances.
Shi'i Islamists pushed for strong parliamentary supremacy, with few
institutional restraints. The Kurds and secular Arabs, meanwhile, argued
for a strong President to counter the Prime Minister and for institutional
mechanisms that would balance against Shi'i Islamist majonitanianism.
Ultimately, the Islamists were generally successful in their efforts, but only
122. Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 10.
123. Id.
124. Indeed, one Islamist politician told U.S. officials he was concerned that without the
changes, Iraq's international treaty obligations could force the country to legalize
homosexuality, in violation of Islamic law.
125. Iraq Const. art. 8.
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after making important concessions concerning institutional arrangements
in the short term.
From the beginning, all Iraqi factions agreed that Iraq's new government
would derive its authority directly from the people. The constitution
declares this principle multiple times in its opening provisions. Even before
Article 2's recognition of the importance of Islam, Article 1 asserts Iraq's
"republican, representative (Parliamentary), democratic and federal"
character. 126 Article 5 goes on to declare that "[t]he law is sovereign," and
that in Iraq "[t]he people are the source of authorities and its legitimacy,
which the people shall exercise in a direct general secret ballot and through
their constitutional institutions." 127 To stress the point further, Article 6
adds that the "[t]ransfer of authority shall be made peacefully through
democratic means." 128 More practically, the constitution later lodges the
overwhelming bulk of political authority in the elected National
Assembly. 129
At the same time as they embraced democracy, however, Iraqi leaders
also recognized the need to balance majority rule with institutional and
structural protections for minorities. The INC political statement from 1992
had stressed the importance of pluralism alongside democracy, and indeed
the INC's formal leadership structure called for a three-man Office of the
Presidency, including a President and two Vice Presidents, that would
include representatives from each of Iraq's major communities. 130 The
IGC's rotating nine-man presidency (five Shi'is, two Sunnis, and two
Kurds) also reflected this commitment to pluralism, as did its decision to
require unanimity and consensus during the TAL drafting process.
Throughout both the TAL and permanent constitutional discussions,
moreover, there was a virtually unquestioned assumption that Iraq would
have a largely ceremonial President, a more powerful Prime Minister, and
that both of these offices would be chosen by an elected Parliament. The
assumption among Iraqi political leaders was that these posts-together
with the Speakership of the National Assembly-would be divided among
the major communities, to ensure representation for each at the most senior
levels of the Iraqi government.
Within these broad outlines, however, there was considerable room for
disagreement over specifics. The most important of these debates
concerned the structure of the Presidency, the process by which the
President and Prime Minister would be selected, and the relative authorities
of each office. Here again, it is useful to examine the final constitutional
126. Iraq Const. art. 1.
127. Id. art. 5.
128. Id. art. 6.
129. See id. arts. 46-62.
130. See INC Articles of Association, supra note 17, arts. 11, 20; see also id. arts. 1 (on
the value of pluralism), 16 (establishing a President and three Vice Presidents to lead the
Executive Council).
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settlement in light of the TAL and early proposals for the permanent
charter.
The TAL executive framework established a Presidency Council,
consisting of a President and two Deputy Presidents, that would be chosen
on a unified ticket by a two-thirds supermajority of the National
Assembly. 131 In addition to performing general ceremonial duties, the
Presidency Council had the right to veto proposed legislation (subject to a
two-thirds override by the National Assembly) and to appoint members of
the Federal Supreme Court (subject to the recommendation of judicial
experts on Iraq's Higher Juridical Council). 132 Perhaps most importantly,
however, the Presidency Council would appoint Iraq's Prime Minister, the
most powerful figure in the government.133 This arrangement ensured that
the leadership posts-including the Presidency Council and Prime
Minister-would be negotiated as a package, and would effectively be
subject to the same two-thirds majority requirement for approval. All
Presidency Council decisions, including those noted above, would be made
unanimously.' 34  Overall, the TAL executive structure embedded the
principle of cross-communal consensus in Iraq's transitional political order.
Chafing at these constraints on their parliamentary majority, the Shi'i
Islamist parties sought to eliminate many of these institutional checks and
balances when negotiating the permanent constitution. In particular, they
sought to replace the Presidency Council with a single President, to be
elected by majority vote of the Parliament. 135 They hoped to weaken the
already weak presidential authorities set forth in the TAL even further, by
eliminating its veto power and role in appointing members of the Supreme
Court. They also sought to limit the President to a single term in office. 136
Most importantly, they denied the President any discretion in naming the
Prime Minister, who would be constitutionally required to come from the
largest electoral bloc within the Parliament. 137 These proposed changes
would have marked a clear departure from the pluralist, consensual model
established in the TAL. Effectively, they would have ensured that the
slimmest of parliamentary majorities-such as the one the Shi'i Islamists
enjoyed in the Transitional National Assembly-would be able to rule Iraq
with few formal institutional constraints.
Unsurprisingly, the Kurds and secular Arabs resisted Shi'i Islamist
efforts in the arena of executive structure. Ultimately, the final constitution
arrived at a unique compromise. It created two separate frameworks for
131. See TAL, art. 36(A).
132. Id. arts. 37, 39(B), 39(C), 44(E).
133. Id. art. 38(A).
134. Id. art. 36(C). If the Presidency Council failed to agree unanimously on a PM
candidate within two weeks, however, the National Assembly would have the right to choose
a Prime Minister, albeit by a two-thirds supermajority. Id. at art. 38(A).
135. See Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 7, 2005), supra note 56, at 20.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 22.
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addressing the structure of the executive--one to be in effect for the first
full four-year term of the elected Parliament, and another to govern
subsequently. 138
Under the first framework, the TAL's tripartite Presidency Council
remained intact. It would still be chosen by the two-thirds majority of
Parliament and make all decisions on the basis of unanimity. 139 The
Presidency Council's veto power also survived, although it could now be
overridden by a three-fifths, instead of two-thirds, majority. 140 There was
no specified presidential role, however, in appointing Supreme Court
judges. 141 The National Assembly would still choose the Presidency
Council, but the Presidency was required to approve the nominee of the
largest parliamentary bloc as Prime Minister.142 While this provision
eliminated the discretion in choosing the Prime Minister existing under the
TAL, it was nonetheless widely expected that the Presidency Council and
Prime Minister would be negotiated as a package, with the two-thirds
requirement for choosing the Presidency effectively giving all communities
leverage over the nomination of the Prime Minister by the largest political
bloc. 143
In the second framework, which will take effect beginning in 2010, the
constitution abolishes the Presidency Council in favor of a single President
(and a Vice President with virtually no constitutional authority of his
own). 144 The President in this framework is truly a figurehead, without
veto power or any authority over appointments. While the constitution
stipulates that the President must be chosen by a two-thirds majority, it also
declares that if no candidate receives such a majority in the first ballot, a
simple majority vote of the National Assembly is sufficient to put him in
office. 145 This provision, coupled with the requirement that the President
charge the nominee of the largest parliamentary bloc with the task of
forming a government as Prime Minister, effectively takes away the
138. See Iraq Const. arts. 63-72, 134. While the underlying political dynamic (Shi'i
Islamists versus Kurds, secular Arabs, and others) drove this compromise, there is no doubt
that it also had much to do with the personalities involved. In particular, Iraqi President Jalal
Talabani, a Kurd who was widely expected to retain his post under the permanent
constitution, refused to accept too severe a diminution of the presidential role set forth in the
TAL. Talabani, who at the time was in his early seventies, only expected to serve a single
term as President under the permanent constitution.
139. See id. art. 134(2) & (4).
140. Id. art. 134(5).
141. See id. arts. 89 & 134(1).
142. Id. arts. 67, 73, 134(1).
143. This is in fact how the negotiations developed following Iraq's second set of
elections on December 15, 2005. After the UIA renominated Ibrahim Jaafari as Prime
Minister, Kurdish and Sunni representatives refused to approve his appointment. Without
their support, Jaafari failed to build the necessary support of two-thirds of the National
Assembly, and the UIA was forced to replace him with Nuri al-Maliki, a compromise
candidate acceptable to the other factions.
144. Iraq Const. arts. 63, 66.
145. Id. art. 67.
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supermajority requirements for government formation that had permeated
both the TAL and the first executive framework.146
The constitutional settlement on executive structure is extremely
important, as it marks significant progress towards the Shi'i Islamist
objective of majoritarian, parliamentary supremacy. By taking away the
formidable leverage in the government formation negotiations now enjoyed
by the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and other minority blocs, it has significant
potential to enhance the power of the Shi'i Islamist parties-so long as they
continue to win a majority of votes in national elections.
D. Federalism
The most contentious feature of the Iraqi constitutional deliberations
concerned federalism. The TAL had recognized the long-standing reality of
Kurdish quasi-autonomy in Northern Iraq, formally legitimating the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as the local authority governing the
northern provinces of Arbil, Sulaimaniya, and Dohuk. 147 The TAL had also
ensured that while the KRG could exercise significant local authority, the
national government would retain full control over foreign and defense
policy, fiscal and monetary policy, and oil resources. 148 At the time, the
TAL settlement was accepted by IGC members who had come to
sympathize with Kurdish demands for autonomy in the opposition period
before the war, and who in many cases had begun to advocate
decentralization for the rest of Iraq. 149 It was viewed with much greater
skepticism, however, by the broader Iraqi society-much of which saw
federalism as an effort by the Kurds to promote the disintegration of the
Iraqi state. 1 50
By the summer of 2005, however, the battle lines on federalism had
changed considerably. The official position of the Shi'i Islamists had
shifted from passive acquiescence to the status quo regarding Kurdistan to
an affirmative desire to create quasi-autonomous federal regions of their
own. The most striking evidence of this new outlook was the aggressive
position taken by SCIRI leader 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, who publicly
called for the creation of a nine-province Shi'i region in Southern Iraq on
August 11.151 Many of Hakim's Shi'i coalition partners remained highly
skeptical of federalism; nonetheless, they went along with Hakim's call for
the Iraqi constitution to allow for the development of new regional
146. Id. art. 73(1).
147. TAL art. 53.
148. Id. art. 25, 54.
149. See, e.g., Visser, supra note 9, at 140-44; Democratic Principles Working Group,
supra note 22, at 91-94; Iraq Found., Declaration of the Shi'i of Iraq (July 15, 2002),
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/news/2002/gjuly/15_declarationenglish.html.
150. On the broader Arab opposition to federalism, see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 44,
at 17-22.
151. Liz Sly, Shiite Wants Autonomous Region, Chi. Trib., Aug. 12, 2005, at 8.
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governments outside of Kurdistan.152 The Shi'i embrace of federalism and
the proposal to create new regions outraged the Sunni Arab members of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee. Indeed, the Sunnis spent virtually all of
their limited political capital in the negotiations on trying to resist the Shi'i
push for federalism, which they feared would lead to a de facto partition of
Iraq and leave Sunni-dominated areas of the country without oil resources.
In the end, the Iraqi constitution established the right of individual
governorates to combine with one another to form new federal regions,
which in turn could exercise expansive authorities equivalent to those of the
Kurdistan Regional Government. 153 This was a clear defeat for the Sunni
negotiators and probably formed the basis for widespread Sunni rejection of
the constitution in the subsequent referendum. 154
The federalism settlement relates to the role of Islam in Iraq's
constitutional order in two important ways. First, support for federalism
was a core element of the broader Shi'i-Kurd understanding that drove
Iraq's constitutional discussions from the early 1990s through the adoption
of the permanent constitution in 2005. For the Kurds, federalism is the sine
qua non of participation in a unified Iraqi state. Any Shi'i effort to roll
back Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq would have unraveled the political
consensus that had united the Iraqi opposition and enabled the passage of
the TAL. Instead, the Shi'is and Kurds struck a strategic bargain in which
Shi'i concessions to Kurdish autonomy were matched by a Kurdish
willingness to allow the Islamists a freer hand outside of Northern Iraq.
While this arrangement did not preclude tough bargaining between Shi'i
Islamists and Kurds on all the issues discussed above, it also provided a
general set of parameters constraining the debate and range of possible
outcomes. Ultimately, the Shi'i-Kurd understanding on federalism allowed
a larger role for Islam at the national level than might otherwise have been
possible.
The federalism provisions of the final constitution also have the potential
to channel Islamist political energy towards regional and local levels of
government. If one or more new regional governments are formed in the
152. For a broader examination of the diversity in Shi'i clerical and political views
towards federalism, see generally Visser, supra note 9. It is likely that unified Shi'i support
for Hakim's general demands (if not for his specific proposal for a nine-province Shi'i
region) stemmed from a larger sense of Shi'i solidarity, especially vis-A-vis the other
factions. Throughout the negotiations, SCIRI leaders explained their demands in terms of
the need to reach parity with the Kurds (i.e., the right to form self-governing regions with
expansive authorities) and to prevent the Sunnis from vetoing legitimate Shi'i demands.
Indeed, given the historical opposition to federalism of such key Shi'i factions as the Da'wa
Party and the Sadrist movement, both of which were heavily represented in the UIA, it is
somewhat mystifying that they never sought to make common cause with the Sunni Arabs,
with whom they shared a negative attitude toward federalism.
153. Iraq Const. arts. 112-17.
154. Sunni hopes for rectifying the final settlement now lie with the Constitutional
Review Commission to be formed by the new Iraqi Parliament, which they hope will place
significant restrictions on the evolution of the federal system, in part by providing for a more
equitable division of revenues from Iraq's oil wealth.
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Shi'i South, they are likely to reflect a more Islamist, sectarian outlook than
the federal authority in Baghdad. At the national level, as we have seen, the
influence of the Shi'i Islamists is significantly counterbalanced by the
Kurds and secular Arabs; Sunni Islamists can also restrain Shi'i sectarian
impulses. The local demographics are sharply different, however, and
southern regions dominated by Shi'i Islamists would be far less constrained
by institutional mechanisms requiring cross-communal consensus. 155
E. Judicial Review
The foregoing discussion makes clear that, while the Iraqi constitution
aims to synthesize Islamic, democratic, and liberal values, it does not
provide clear and specific guidelines for resolving potential conflicts among
them. The text constrains the range of possible constitutional
interpretations, but is not sufficiently precise to answer each and every
question for all time. In many cases, the imprecision of the final text was
not the result of sloppy drafting or carelessness, but rather the product of
conscious strategies by competing drafters to defer certain contentious
political issues for resolution in the future.
For this reason, the mechanisms for formal constitutional interpretation
are especially important. The Iraqi constitution creates a Federal Supreme
Court to serve as the supreme arbiter of constitutional matters.1 56 The
Court's right to strike down legislation is implicit in a host of key
constitutional provisions, including Article 2 (prohibiting laws
contradicting the principles of Islam, democracy, or rights and basic
freedoms), Article 13 (establishing the supremacy of the constitution over
all federal and regional law), and Article 90 (giving the Court itself the right
to oversee the constitutionality of statutes, interpret the constitution, and
settle disputes concerning federalism). 157  The establishment of an
independent Supreme Court, appointed by the political authorities and
subject to the law, was never controversial among Iraqi leaders. The Iraqi
opposition before the war had embraced the concept of an independent
judiciary, 158 and the TAL had created an independent Supreme Court with
the right to exercise judicial review. 159
155. That said, they would still be restrained by the constitution's human-rights
guarantees. Peter Galbraith has argued, incorrectly, that regional law has primacy over these
federal human-rights protections, due to constitutional provisions allowing regional law to
displace federal law in areas outside of the "exclusive" powers of the federal government.
His reading overlooks both the constitution's supremacy clause and the fact that while the
constitution permits regional law to displace "national legislation" in certain areas, it does
not declare that such law may supercede the constitution itself. See Galbraith, supra note 13,
at 200; see also Iraq Const. arts. 13, 117.
156. Iraq Const. arts. 89-91.
157. Id. arts. 2, 13, 90.
158. See INC Articles of Association, supra note 17, art. 1.
159. See TAL art. 44. Indeed, the TAL marked the first time in Iraqi history that judicial
independence had been constitutionally protected. Istrabadi, supra note 43, at 297.
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What did provoke controversy-at least in the debate over the permanent
constitution-was the composition of the Supreme Court, and the
mechanism for selecting judges. The TAL provisions concerning the
Supreme Court had been deliberately crafted (by Adnan Pachachi, his chief
aide Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, and Salem Chalabi) to ensure the Court's
moderation, and to preclude its manipulation by political factions. 160 The
Shi'i Islamists chose not to engage actively in the TAL discussions over the
Court, perhaps because they sensed that it would not have time to make
substantive decisions during the period the TAL would be in effect.
According to TAL Article 44, the Higher Juridical Council (a largely
secular body drawn from Iraq's leading civil jurists) would nominate three
judges for every Supreme Court vacancy. 161 The three-person Presidency
Council would then unanimously fill each vacancy from the nominees. 
162
This approach, which bypassed the National Assembly entirely, biased the
selection process in favor of experienced civil law judges capable of
winning consensus approval across each of Iraq's major communities.
In contrast to their passivity during the TAL judiciary debates, the Shi'i
Islamists were extremely active in shaping the judicial branch established in
the permanent constitution. Initially, they proposed a separate
Constitutional Council to sit above the Federal Supreme Court and concern
itself exclusively with constitutional review. 163 Moreover, recognizing that
the Article 2 noncontradiction clause created a constitutional basis for
striking down laws based on their incompatibility with Islamic values, the
Shi'i bloc demanded that at least four of the Court's eleven seats be filled
by shari'a experts. 164 They also sought to strengthen the Parliament's role
in shaping the Court, both by giving it the right to appoint judges and by
including a new, vague provision declaring that the Court would be
"answerable before the National Assembly."' 165 Most of these initiatives
were resisted by the same coalition of Kurds, secular Arabs, and the United
States, all of whom recognized that the Shi'i proposals were aimed at
promoting greater Islamic and clerical influence over the process of
constitutional interpretation.
As the constitutional talks approached the late summer deadline, Iraqi
negotiators agreed to postpone some of the most vexing issues concerning
the Court. They decided that there would be no separate Constitutional
Council, but that the Supreme Court members would include "experts in
Islamic jurisprudence" alongside judges and other legal experts. 166 They
also agreed, however, that the size of the court and the precise mechanisms
for appointing its members would be determined in a special law to be
160. Diamond, supra note 43, at 148-50.
161. TAL art. 44(E).
162. Id.
163. Hammudi Draft Const. (Aug. 8, 2005), supra note 56, at 33.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Iraq Const. art. 89(2).
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enacted by a two-thirds supermajority of the National Assembly 1 67 This
compromise gave the Shi'i Islamists a symbolic victory--explicit
recognition of the need for Islamic experts on the Court-while granting
other factions influence and leverage over the implementing legislation that
would ultimately shape the Court's composition.
III. CONCLUSION
It is too early to tell, as of this writing, whether Iraq's formally
democratic constitutional order will take root, much less prosper. The
legacy of dictatorship, the difficulties of building an Iraqi political identity
that bridges ethnic and sectarian divides, and the challenge of defeating a
vicious insurgency and averting civil war all loom large. Nonetheless, it is
not too soon to draw some tentative conclusions about the Iraqi
constitutional process as it has evolved thus far. Four points stand out in
particular.
First, the Iraqi constitution is a product of a political bargain struck
before the war among the leading parties of the Iraqi opposition. These
parties agreed (albeit at a high level of generality) that a new Iraqi regime
would embrace Islam, democracy, pluralism, federalism, and human rights.
After the war, the former Iraqi oppositionists returned home to their
country, and proceeded to implement their political vision.168 They were
only able to do so, however, because the program devised in exile was
generally amenable to the broad mass of Iraqi society, which was eager to
replace the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein with a more moderate
and democratic regime. Above all, however, their vision was supported by
the Shi'i clerical leadership, and in particular Grand Ayatollah Sistani,
167. Id.
168. Some have argued that the formerly exiled Iraqi oppositionists are somehow devoid
of democratic political legitimacy by virtue of the long periods of time many spent outside
the country. While this argument may have been plausible in March 2003, that is no longer
the case today. Indeed, the former exiles have now triumphed in two sets of democratic
elections, and have drafted a constitution that won the approval of seventy-eight percent of
Iraqi voters. Former exiles-and especially Hakim, Jaafari, and 'Allawi--consistently
receive high ratings in Iraqi opinion polls, and the Islamist exiles in particular have enjoyed
such public support since the very beginning of the post-Saddam Hussein era. As tempting
as it may be for some international commentators to dismiss Iraq's leading Shi'i politicians
as "out of touch with popular sentiment," see Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 50, at 11, these
assessments simply fly in the face of virtually any fair measure of Iraqi public opinion. For
criticisms along these lines, see id. at 11; Pollack, supra note 31, at 54-55. For a sampling of
the public opinion polls, see Robin Wright, Religious Leaders Ahead in Iraq Poll, Wash.
Post, Oct. 22, 2004, at Al; Int'l Republican Inst., Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion 18, 25-26
(July 2005), available at http://www.iri.org/pdfs/08-10-05-Iraq%20poll%20presentation.ppt;
Int'l Republican Inst., Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion 23 (Jan. 2005), available at
http://www.iri.org/pdfs/1-29-05%20poll%20presentation.ppt; Office of Research Opinion
Analysis, Dep't of State, Iraqi Public Has Wide-Ranging Preferences for a Future Political
System, (Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/government/politicaLpoll.pdf. For a defense of the legitimacy of the Iraqi political
class, see Galbraith, supra note 13, at 122-24.
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whose democratic fatwa in June 2004 powerfully endorsed the
compatibility of Islam and democracy.
Second, despite consensus on overarching political principles, Iraqi
politicians engaged in a series of tough debates concerning the
implementation of these ideas-both in the TAL and permanent
constitution. These debates pitted a united Shi'i Islamist bloc against a
looser coalition of Kurds, secular Arab nationalists, and the United States.
As the constitutional process became more democratic-particularly
following the historic Iraqi election of January 30, 2005-the Shi'i
Islamists grew stronger, and were able to tilt constitutional outcomes in
their favor. That said, no single group was capable of dominating the
process unilaterally, and all sides made important concessions and
compromises in the course of the negotiations. The intensity of the debates,
however, makes clear that-while there may now be a constitutional
agreement-there is not yet a fundamental consensus on the extent to which
Islamic politics will play a role in Iraq's emerging democratic order.
Third, there is no question that the United States played an important role
in Iraq's constitutional process. Beyond the American military role in
deposing Saddam Hussein, U.S. diplomats were also instrumental in
defining the procedures and mechanisms for adopting a permanent charter,
shaping the TAL, and helping to broker agreements on difficult issues in the
final negotiations. Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate American
influence in shaping the substantive constitutional outcome, particularly
regarding the role of Islam. 169 For the most part, the U.S. role was in
facilitating, not imposing, constitutional compromises-usually at the
initiative of the Iraqi players themselves. While it is true that America's
stated goals in Iraq included the construction of a democratic regime, it is
no less true that this goal was shared by the Iraqi political class and the vast
majority of Iraqi citizens. And when American objectives differed from
those of the Iraqis with regard to constitutional outcomes-most obviously
with regard to the role of religion-the Iraqi consensus was ultimately
dispositive. Indeed, if before the war the Bush Administration had been
told that the final Iraqi constitution would formally prohibit any law
contradicting Islam (or rehabilitate shari 'a as an option for personal-status
law, or require Islamic experts to serve on Iraq's Supreme Court), it would
have been very surprised indeed.170
Finally, it is important to recognize that Iraq's constitutional process is
not yet over, despite the formal ratification of a final text in October 2005.
The Iraqi constitution allows for a wide range of interpretations and
169. For examples of such overstatements, see Galbraith, supra note 13, at 139-40;
William R. Polk, Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History from Genghis
Khan's Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation
180-81 (2005); Andrew Arato, Interim Imposition, 18 Ethics & Int'l Aff. 25, 25-50 (2004).
170. One of the authors, writing in the prewar period, emphasized the likelihood of
Islamic democracy emerging in any Arab state undergoing rapid democratization. See Noah
Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (2003).
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political outcomes. Its provisions are frequently indeterminate, containing
numerous points of internal tension and ambiguity, especially in its
approach to integrating Islamic values with liberal provisions on equality
and human rights. The text also allows for considerable constitutional
development through ordinary legislation, the composition of the Federal
Supreme Court, and the evolution of Iraq's federal system. Moreover, it is
possible that the Constitutional Review Commission, originally proposed in
an effort to blunt Sunni opposition to the constitution, will also allow for
substantive adjustments or clarifications of various provisions relating to
Islam.
While the constitutional text takes important steps toward determining
the relationship between Islam and the state, that relationship will also be
shaped by the evolution of Iraq's political party system. Simply put, Iraqi
politics remains in flux. It is not clear whether the postwar rise of ethnic
and sectarian identity politics will continue, or whether cross-confessional
nationalist parties will emerge and gain traction over time. Nor is it clear
whether the Shi'i Islamist parties will continue to look beyond their internal
rivalries and disagreements and present a unified front at the national level.
Their unity to date, a considerable achievement largely attributable to
Sistani's leadership, was critical to increasing the prominence of Islam in
the constitution. And then there is the emerging class of democratically
elected Sunni Arab leaders. It remains to be seen how they will fit into the
Iraqi political spectrum-and, in particular, whether they will back Shi'i
Islamist efforts to enhance the role of religion in politics or make common
cause with the Kurds and secular Arabs against Shi'i sectarianism. All of
these political developments will have important ramifications for Islam's
ultimate place within Iraq's constitutional system.
In short, the Iraqi constitutional process continues, even after the
successful referendum in October 2005. Iraq's historic effort to synthesize
Islam and democracy will be shaped as much by evolving political
conditions as by the strictures of the constitutional text. Its success or
failure will also depend on the Iraqi government's ability to stabilize and
secure the country in the face of the ongoing insurgency and sectarian
violence. This is not to minimize the significance of Iraq's constitution-
only to recognize that the document itself marks not the end, or even the
beginning of the end, but perhaps the end of the beginning, of Iraq's
democratic development.
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